


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


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

14 October 1964

DAILY BRIEF

South Vietnam: [The High National Council appears to be making a concerted effort to form a provisional government by the 27 October deadline.]

[Council members have told the US Embassy that they intend to publish a provisional charter this week, and hope to complete their other work by 20 October. This entails designation of a chief of state authorized to choose a premier. The latter would then form his own government, subject to council approval.]


[The council now believes that the installation of a national assembly should be deferred for three or four months to allow time to organize elections.]

[Mutual suspicion still exists between General Khanh and the council, although a face to face meeting was scheduled for yesterday in order to clear the air. The council members fear that Khanh is maneuvering to stay in power and that he may organize mass demonstrations in his own behalf. Khanh insists that he prefers a leading military role, but is worried that the council may adopt a weak parliamentary system or select leaders unacceptable to the military.]

[The Viet Cong meanwhile are maintaining heavy pressure in the countryside. Although armed attacks still represent only a small percentage of Communist

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activity, battalion-sized assaults on government troops or installations are again occurring and there has been a marked rise in casualties on both sides. 7 25X1



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DAILY BRIEF

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Cyprus: [Turkish Cypriot morale has declined sharply in the past few weeks.]

[A US official touring Turkish villages in western Cyprus has found that food stocks are low in several towns. Unemployment, the need to provide for refugees, and a lack of currency to buy supplies on the local market are also major problems. Turkish Cypriot leaders in this area seemed "tired and beaten."]

[Although these leaders continue to give lip service to partition of Cyprus, they insist that the present abnormal situation must end soon. They continue to look to Ankara for a "speeding up" of whatever course of action is decided upon--either separation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island or evacuation of Turkish Cypriots to Turkey.]

[The issues of opening of the Nicosia-Kyrenia road and of rotating Turkish troops to Cyprus are still at an impasse.]

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
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DAILY BRIEF

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Mozambique: [Portuguese authorities appear to be concerned over nationalist activities in northern Mozambique.]

[Mozambique security forces are trying to uncover small "cells" of amateur saboteurs who have recently attacked roads and bridges near the Tanganyika border. The Portuguese may also be creating a no man's land along the border before the coming rainy season, which would favor rebel activities. Since early this month several thousand African refugees are reported to have crossed into Tanganyika.]

[The present terrorism and sabotage in Mozambique is probably promoted by an extremist wing of the Mozambique nationalist front, which may be trying to win international support over the main front organization. The latter's chief, US-educated Eduardo Mondlane, who is currently visiting Eastern Europe, has recently reiterated that his organization is not ready to begin serious military activity.]

[The Mozambique nationalists have long used Tanganyika as their base, and the Tanganyikan Government may now be worried over possible Portuguese retaliation. Tanganyika has reinforced its side of the border with a few antiaircraft guns as well as troops.]

[Lisbon has taken no official public notice of nationalist activity in Mozambique, but on 11 October the government-controlled press for the first time headlined stories of terrorist bands from Tanganyika and of Communist infiltration into Tanganyika.]

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*Venezuela: The Venezuelan cabinet tendered its proforma resignation yesterday in preparation for the formation of a new "broad based government" under President Leoni.

The resignation of the cabinet paves the way for the necessary ministerial reshuffle whereby the Republican Democratic Union (URD) and the National Democratic Front (FND) will obtain larger participation in the government in return for their support in Congress.

Several weeks ago, after months of negotiations, a common program of action was worked out between President Leoni's Democratic Action Party, and the leaders of the URD and the FND to form a government coalition. By this agreement, Leoni will be assured of 37 of 50 seats in the Senate, and 113 of 179 in the Chamber of Deputies.

Meanwhile, in the wake of Colonel Michael Smolen's release by the Communist-dominated Armed Forces for National Liberation (FALN), Venezuelan police continue to make arrests and searches. Their purpose is not only to capture those directly involved in the Smolen kidnaping, but also to damage the FALN apparatus to the extent that it will be deterred from future operations of this nature.

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